ASCMA : A cash-rich play

by valuegeek on June 20, 2010

Companies trading at below net cash on hand are favorite investigative targets of value investors. Back in the Depression era, and during the brief market bottom in 2009, such stocks were plentiful. These days, however, such net cash companies are typically trading below cash for very good reasons, most commonly, because they are losing money and the cash pile is expected to shrink. Nevertheless, once in a blue moon, one comes across a net cash company with actual hidden earnings and growth prospects. ASCMA is one such company.

Ascent Media was spun off in May 2008 from Discovery Holdings (now Discovery Communications DISCA), the largest provider of non-fiction media and entertainment, and the owner of Discovery Channel and Animal Planet. Ascent Media provides support and post-production services to content producers, including digital conversion and enhancement, formatting, and distribution via satellite and the internet to worldwide movie theaters and TV stations. The company has no long-term debt, and total liabilities of $96M is offset by $97M in receivables. This leaves the company with $383M in cash and tradeable securities (consisting of diversified corporate bond funds), plus another $190M in long term assets. All this is currently trading at a market capitalization of about $370M, or below net cash. This means that we essentially get the $190M of long-term assets for free!

Why is ASCMA so undervalued? Firstly, it was spun off in 2008 through distribution of ASCMA shares to shareholders of Discover Holdings. Many of those shareholders found themselves holding shares of a business they did not fully understand nor want to understand, and proceeded to sell the shares indiscriminately. The resulting rapid decline in the stock price has baked in low expectations for this company. Also, as a newly spun-off company, there is no analyst coverage. Secondly, there are no comparable publicly traded companies on which one can benchmark. Most post-production houses are in-house divisions of large motion picture companies such as Walt Disney and Paramount Pictures, which typically do not break out their financial performance. The closest publicly traded companies are specialized outfits such as Technicolor (TCH) and Dolby Laboratories (DLB), which are not really comparable since ASCMA owns a much broader set of post-production companies and is more diversified. Lastly, the turmoil brought about by the 2008-2009 financial crisis has also taken a toll on its business. Advertising rates have plummeted, and processing of commercials have historically contributed as much as half of ASCMA’s revenue. (However, anecdoctal reports suggest that TV advertising rates will recover this year.) Mergers of cable companies have also weakened ASCMA’s negotiating position for its services. Certainly, the fact that ASCMA had an net loss of $50M in 2009 has scared away all weak hands.

What is the value of ASCMA’s $190M worth of long-term assets? ASCMA’s assets are mainly property and equipment at approximately 56 sites worldwide, including a satellite earth station in Minnesota, and leased satellite facilities in Singapore. With these facilities, ASCMA provides a variety of post-production services, including converting film into digital masters, digital enhancement and special effects, formatting content and commercials into a continuous feed for TV and cable, and distribution of commercials and shows worldwide through satellite and Internet. It also occasionally provides engineering consulting to companies who are trying to design multimedia delivery networks, such as Motorola. The profitability of this business is hard to estimate. Certainly, recent performance has been dismal, given that in 2009, ASCMA had a net loss of $50M. There appears to be 2 main reasons for this lack of profitability. Firstly, in 2009, there was a dramatic drop-off in the engineering consulting business, and more modest declines in other lines of business, which is understandable given the 2009 economic climate. Secondly, Discovery seems to have acquired its ASCMA assets in a piecemeal fashion with no real attempt to streamline costs, and as a result, there may be duplicative assets and inefficient cost structures.

However, I am optimistic about the value of the $190M of long-term assets. Management has stated that it is streamlining operations, and indeed has been selling off assets. Due to these asset sales, despite losses in operations, the cash pile has actually grown from $200M in 2007 to over $300M in 2010, which is definitely atypical of companies trading at net cash. Notably, all recent asset sales have resulted in ASCMA booking gains, an amazing feat considering that these sales took place in a weak economic environment, suggesting that the $190M is an underestimate of the true value. Also of note is that goodwill has been impaired to zero, and the $190M of assets is a fully depreciated estimate of the value of property and equipment, with no accounting for any possible intangible value. However, there is still the matter of whether the asset sales will be sufficient to offset losses at the operating level. Management has articulated a strategy of asset sales to streamline operations, retaining enough assets to provide an end-to-end service to content providers, from post-production processing to distribution, which seems to be a rational strategy. There will always be a demand for post-production services from advertisers and small production houses. Production houses will be leery of contracting these essential processes out to the post-production outfits of major motion picture companies, who are direct competitors. ASCMA is the only major independent post-production company that can provide a full suite of services. It processes about 70% of all TV commercials in the UK and 35% of TV commercials in the US, and also processes major motion pictures such as “The Hurt Locker” and TV productions like “House”. Furthermore, industries relying on creativity, such as the fashion industry and the movie and advertising businesses, tend to be fragmented and stay fragmented, because small outfits with good ideas continually enter the industry. There is no apparent reason why post-production services cannot be run on a profitable basis. There may be a temporary over-capacity due to decline in advertising and content volumes, but as in most cyclical industries, what eventually happens is that marginal and poorly-capitalized providers are shaken out of the system, and the supply-demand equilibrium is restored. Based on ASCMA’s first quarter 2010 results, it appears that operating performance is near break-even, and cash flow is actually positive again (even after excluding asset sales). While the value of ASCMA is hard to estimate, I think that asset sales of duplicative assets will more than make up for operational losses while the company and the industry as a whole streamlines into a more sustainable cost structure, and therefore I estimate that ASCMA should be worth its book value of around $570M ($380M cash plus $190M assets), or about $40 per share, a gain of 50% from its current price. This is obviously just a stab at valuation. The key point is that the cash pile is growing and not shrinking even in a weak economic environment, although the cash levels may be very volatile based on the timing of asset sales and business recovery.

Is the current management capable of carrying out its strategy? The major shareholder is John Malone, who owns 80% of the Class B supervoting stock in addition to Class A ordinary stock, and has 30% of the voting power. Malone is a veteran businessman in the media business, having been CEO and Chairman of Liberty Media and DirectTV. Malone is known to be an aggressive businessman with a keen eye for value. Interestingly, Malone has recently spent $1M of his own money to purchase even more shares of ASCMA. Another interesting name that caught my eye in the shareholder list is Mario Gabelli, a notable value investor who owns 8.8% of ASCMA. With these two veteran value-oriented investors guiding capital allocation decisions, I am confident that ASCMA will emerge as a streamlined, cost-efficient, and cash-rich post-production services company.

What are the risks associated with this investment? As with investments in any cash-rich company, there is always a cash-conversion risk, where management can squander cash on a bad investment. However, given the business reputation of Malone as the controlling shareholder, I think that this is a remote possibility. Secondly, the economy can always tank again, taking advertising rates down with it. But even in this scenario, I think that the cash pile will act as a cushion to further stock declines.

Disclosure : I have a long position in ASCMA.

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FLL : A casino that isn’t a gamble

by valuegeek on June 13, 2010

John Paulson’s recent investment in casino stocks piqued my own interest in this sector, and I started looking for value in some of the smaller cap casino stocks. I believe that with the massive consumer retrenchment last year, 2009 should represent the generational low in casino earnings. Any casino companies that emerge from last year with a clean balance sheet and still making some profits should be well-poised to gain from an economic recovery, and should be able to withstand even a double dip recession. I found one casino company that met these criteria, the small-cap stock FLL.

Full House Resorts owns one casino, Stockman’s Casino in Fallon, Nevada. It also manages two other casinos, Harrington Raceway and Casino, in Harrington, Delaware, and FireKeeper’s Casino, in Battle Creek, Michigan. As of Mar 2010, the company has $12M in cash, and no long term debt. Stockman’s Casino is FLL’s smallest casino at 8400 sq ft. It has 280 slot machines and 4 table games, a keno table, and a fine dining restaurant. Stockman’s is the largest of several casinos in the city, commanding approximately 36% of slot revenues in the city. Stockman’s was acquired by FLL in 2007 for $28M, when it had a net operating profit of $2.5M. In 2009, Stockman’s net profit has declined to $2M annually, although it is gaining market share in the city of Fallon and profits are expected to stabilize. FLL also has a management contract with Harrington Raceway Inc., the owner of Harrington Raceway and Casino. Harrington’s Raceway and Casino occupies 35K sq ft, with some 2100 slot machines, an entertainment lounge, a 350 seat buffett, and a 50 seat diner. The management contract has been in place since 1996 (and will expire in Aug 2011), and pursuant to the contract, FLL receives a management fee based on Harrington Casino’s annual revenues and operating profit, and the fee is contractually guaranteed to increase at least 5% per year. The management fee from Harrington was 4.9M in 2009. Harrington faces strong competition from nearby casinos in Delaware, and probable new casinos in Maryland, and revenues are expected to hold steady or decline. Lastly, FLL also has a seven year contract to manage the FireKeeper’s Casino in Michigan, which is owned by the Michigan Tribe. FireKeeper’s Casino is the largest casino that FLL runs. At 230K sq ft, it has 2680 slot machines, 78 table games, 12 poker tables, 5 restaurants, and is expected to attract 2.9M visitors annually. It is the only casino within 100 miles (although there is a new Indian casino under construction some 70 miles to the north), and has just opened in Aug 2009. The management contract expires in Aug 2016, and FLL gets a 26% cut of net operating profits after all expenses and interest costs have been paid, with the Tribe getting the remaining 74% of profits. The fee must split 50% with RAM, a partner which contributed initial capital to the FireKeeper’s Casino, although the split will be adjusted to 70-30 in favor of FLL once RAM has fully recouped its initial investment. In the months since the opening of FireKeeper’s Casino, management fees to FLL have been running at 1M per month. However, RAM is expected to recoup its investment inside of 1 year, and FLL will then be receiving 1.4M monthly, for an annual fee of approximately 17M. FLL has 12 employees, 6 senior management, and 6 support personnel, operating out of a small leased office in Las Vegas, Nevada. Corporate expenses run at about 4 to 4.5M annually. Thus, the net income from FLL is about $19.5M, minus 35% for taxes, or about $12.5M in owner’s cash flow.

FLL’s current market cap is about $57.5M. If you subtract $12M in cash, this means that the market is valuing FLL’s cash flow at only $45.5M, or about 3.6 times earnings, an earnings yield of some 27%. How can such a bargain exist? I believe that several factors have led to this mis-valuation. Firstly, FLL is a micro-cap company in an unpopular sector, with zero analyst coverage. Secondly, the completion of FireKeeper’s Casino, the major cash flow contributor to FLL, has been delayed repeatedly, and has finally started operations less than 1 year ago. Therefore investors may not have had time to re-calibrate their expectations. Thirdly, the casino management business model, while less capital-hungry than outright purchase of casinos, may produce a less consistent cash flow, as management contracts have to be re-negotiated when they expire. We can however, make some conservative projections. Lets say that 2009 is the lowest point in casino earnings, and earnings are expected to remain at 2009 levels even in a double dip recession. Lets also assume that when Harrington’s contract expires in 2011, due to a combination of stronger competition and contract renegotiation, earnings from Harrington’s drop from $5M to $3M. Assume further that in 2016, when the FireKeeper’s contract expires, it is also renegotiated downwards. The management cut in Indian casinos tend to range from 20-30%. However, in 2016, FLL will no longer need RAM as a capital-contributing partner, and will be able to capture the full management fee instead of just 70%. Furthermore, any new management company will have to rebuild a certain amount of infrastructure, and therefore is expected to compete at a disadvantage to FLL for a renewal. If the cut decreases to 20%, but FLL now captures 100% of the management fee, the cash flow to FLL will actually go dramatically up, rather than down. Even under reasonably pessimistic assumptions, beyond 2011, corporate expenses will be covered by the cash flow from the Stockman’s and Harrington casinos, leaving fees from FireKeeper’s as pure profit, which is likely to run at $15-25M, minus 35% for taxes, for a free cash flow or $10-16M. I believe that the cash flow will bottom out at $10M, and is likely to rise substantially above that in an economic recovery scenario, possibly as much as $20M. If we apply a PE of 10 to a lowball cash flow of $10M, we arrive at a target capitalization of $100M, plus $12M in cash, for a total of $112M, or a $6.22 share price, about double current price.

What are the potential catalysts for re-valuation of this stock down the road? Firstly, the CEO has been purchasing stock for his personal account, and the company has been repurchasing stock in the recent past (the company repurchased 1.2M of shares at $1.21 in 2008, shrinking the share base to 18M), and stock repurchases are ongoing. All this stock repurchases will further increase the EPS. Secondly, 2011 is expected to be a bumper year for FLL even in a recession. Earnings from Harrington’s is going to increase to its peak just before contract expiration due to the 5% mandatory minimum increase, and there will be a reset of the FireKeeper’s split from 50-50 to 70-30. Therefore, some eye-popping EPS numbers are likely to be recorded in 2011, which will likely finally register with some investors.

In summary, I believe FLL to be conservatively worth at least $6.22 per share. FLL has a completely clean balance sheet and strong cash flows, and will have positive cash flow even in a double dip recession. In the event of an economic recovery, just a modest increase in casino revenues over 2009 is likely to propel FLL substantially above $6, perhaps even to $10-12.

Disclosure : I have a long position in FLL.

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