CKEC : A Conviction Buy

February 22, 2011

Once in a blue moon, I come across a stock which is so severely undervalued that it makes my heart race. CKEC is one such stock. While the stock is a microcap and is relatively illiquid, I believe that if one takes the time to slowly accumulate a significant position, the rewards will be well worth the wait.

Carmike Cinemas (CKEC) is the 3rd largest cinema chain in the US, with 240 theatres and 2241 screens, although you’ve probably never heard of them. This is because Carmike focuses on small to mid size cities, where they are often the only theatre in town, and has no presence in major metropolitan cities. The cinema industry went on a building boom and took on too much debt in the 1990s, and 12 operators went bankrupt in 2000, including Carmike. It emerged from bankruptcy in 2002 with 327 theatres, and since then has been in deleveraging mode, closing marginal theatres and paying down debt. After the boom, the industry as a whole has largely rationalized, with a net elimination of theatres, and a wave of mergers. A notable consolidation is the 2005 merger of Loews Cinemas with AMC, creating the second largest cinema chain in the US, second to Regal Cinemas. Carmike itself acquired GKC Theatres in 2005, which owned 30 theatres, for $61.6M. As a result, over-capacity has largely been eliminated. Since Carmike’s emergence from bankruptcy in 2002, despite closing nearly 30% of its theatres, Carmike’s revenue has actually increased, ranging from a low of $469M in 2005 to a high of $514M in 2009. Ticket price per patron has risen from $5.35 in 2005 to $6.78 in 2010, and concession sales per patron has risen from $2.52 in 2005 to $3.44 in 2010, handily outpacing inflation. And most investors are aware that the cinema and movie industries are recession-resistant. In times of economic stress, people flock to communal activities like the movies. Therefore, despite some secular challenges that are routinely trotted out (high definition large screen TVs, Netflix, internet streaming, a shrinking DVD window period, direct-to-DVD movies etc.), I believe that CKEC will probably do okay in both an inflationary environment as well as a double dip recession. In effect, CKEC is a quasi-monopoly. If a small town can support only a single cinema, then a competing cinema chain would know that setting up another cinema would cause both itself and Carmike to lose money, and would not do so. CKEC’s revenues are limited only by the size of the town, its customers’ disposable income, and competition from other entertainment.

However, short interest in both RGC and CVEC have been rising recently, which I believe are driven by the lackluster box office earnings in 2011 thus far, coming in below box office earnings in 2010/2009. While cinema revenues in general are heavily influenced by box office numbers, the short thesis has several holes. Firstly, box office takings are unpredictable even to Hollywood veterans, and although YTD box office takings are trailing 2010 and 2009 numbers, a couple of blockbuster hits later in the year can easily make up lost ground. Secondly, Carmike’s customer demographic differs from the larger RGC and AMC-Loews cinemas, and skews towards action/adventure/comedy movies and away from dramas. And finally, while per-ticket sales are lower with Carmike than with bigger competitors, ticket volumes tend to be more steady with Carmike, a reflection of the more limited entertainment options available in smaller cities and towns. Therefore, Carmike is less susceptible to poor box office numbers.

Before I go into a valuation for Carmike, I am going to first point out several features from the financials. Firstly, Carmike generates more cash than is reflected by its net income. Its cap-ex is limited to a maximum of $22M per year due to a loan covenant, which is substantially below the $30M-$40M of depreciation reported, therefore free cash flow should be boosted by $10-$15M annually. In addition, nearly all of Carmike’s theatres have already been converted to digital distribution and projection, and 80% of the theatres have 3D screens, so the bulk of the big ticket cap-ex items are behind it. The company operates on a negative working capital basis, because its revenues are received in cash, while its suppliers are paid later, therefore it essentially runs its business off other people’s money. Debt consists of $233M in a term loan due in 2016, at an interest rate of LIBOR plus 3.5%. About half the loan is hedged with interest rate swaps to not exceed 9.5% in interest, and the average interest rate in the quarter ending Sep 2010 was 5.50%. Some leased land and buildings are also accounted for as capitalized leases totaling $116M, and the rent is accounted for as interest, approximately $20M to 25M annually.

I will now estimate a conservative valuation based on the lowest revenue for CKEC in the past 8 years, which was around $470M in 2005. Gross margin for Carmike is approximately 20%, which gives $94M in operating earnings. I assume the following expenses : $17M for SG&A, $22M for cap-ex, $14M for interest (6% interest on 233M LTD), $25M for rent on capitalized leases, $6M for taxes, which would give a free cash flow of $10M. I assume a PE multiplier of 12 for Carmike’s recession resistant business with favorable economic characteristics, which would give a total valuation of $120M, approximately 30% above its current market cap of $93M.

And finally, I’ve saved the kicker for last, for the patient reader which has made it thus far. In October 2010, Carmike signed an agreement with Screenvision giving it 30 year exclusive right to show pre-movie advertising in Carmike’s cinemas. In return, Carmike will receive a $30M check in January 2011, plus 20% ownership of Screenvision. Screenvision is a private company and its value is not easily estimated, but Shamrock Capital has recently purchased a 50% stake in the company for $160M, which would value Screenvision at $320M. After the transaction, Shamrock has a 61.2% stake in Screenvision, Technicolor holds a 18.8% stake, and Carmike holds a 20% stake. Incredibly, the market seems to have completely missed the value of this deal to Carmike. Even assuming a 100% control premium to Shamrock’s transaction, it would give a $30M value to Carmike’s stake in Screenvision, and together with the $30M check, should boost Carmike’s valuation by $60M. Therefore, I’m comfortable giving CKEC a valuation of $180M, or a $14 per share value, nearly double current prices. And note that this is based on a conservative estimate of box office earning, which may spike higher if a blockbuster movie suddenly appear. And I anticipate that CKEC will surge higher once the $30M check and 20% stake actually appears on the balance sheet. Based on the astounding undervaluation coupled with superb business characteristics, I’ve designated CKEC a conviction buy, and have made it the largest position in my portfolio.

Disclosure : I own shares in CKEC.

{ 14 comments… read them below or add one }

Sam Clarkson February 22, 2011 at 12:38 pm

wow, exciting write-up.
I’m going to do some reading now, thanks!

In the meantime,
TO what do you attribute DFA, rennaisance and keeley selling out?
they just scraped the barrel at $5 something and are cashing in?

Sam Clarkson February 22, 2011 at 2:43 pm

OK,
So why do earnings next year get a 12x multiple when cash from operations has been overwhelmed by negative cash for the last several years?

It seems that the recession did affect revenues a bit, or was that downsizing operations?

I’d say as an alternate and rough valuation – $1 mil per owned theater, call the leased operations a wash with the debt, and add in 30 mil in cash from screenvision, and you get $92 million.
ok, then add in 30 million for the illiquid stake in screenvision.
122 million.

interesting, for sure, thanks again. I’d love to see some quantifiable free cash flow in the recent past. WHy do you think there is none?

PK February 22, 2011 at 5:30 pm

If you look at 2007 – 2010, average FCF is about $21 million/year (OCF + proceeds from sales of PPE – CapEx – Repayments of capital leases). The current market cap is about $90 million and as of 9/30/10 outstanding debt was about $235 million with cash of about $5 million. Based on those numbers, enterprise value is about $320 million. So, EV/FCF = 15.2

In light of the Screenvision deal, those numbers appear to be outdated. So, let’s assume that $30 million goes to pay down debt (as the company has said it intends to do) and let’s assume the Screenvision equity stake is worth $30 million. That gives the movie theater business an enterprise value of about $260. EV/FCF is 12.4.

Is that cheap for this business? A very quick check of RGC suggests average FCF of $203 million and an EV of $3.7 billion. EV/FCF = 18.22. I wonder what the numbers are for other competitors.

Steblaj February 25, 2011 at 10:08 am

Interesting to see that there is always a different way to value the same business.
I’d stick with this, without getting a look into the SEC fillings: for $93 mil you get a $30 mil stake in Screenvision and for the rest you get a business which generates $21 mil in FCF. Not bad.

Good luck to all.

Sam March 4, 2011 at 11:37 am

Maybe I missed it, but who actually wrote this? Also, investment credentials would be appreciated.

Jim Beynon March 6, 2011 at 11:00 am

I can tell that you are long on the stock as you have definitely not mentioned ANY of the risks associated with the future of exhibition. You neglected to mention the decreasing release-to-video window and the individualization of video similar to the music industry. You mentioned the low cap-x but not the fact that they are not replacing or maintaining their asset base and it has declined in net value as well as in consumer perception. You neglect to mention that the key driver to theatre economics, attendance per screen, has declined over 12% during the past four years as well as the fact that small markets are more sensitive to the large price increases that the industry has been experiencing.

As far as the valuation, your numbers are completely bogus. Operating income for 9 months has declined 25% over the past three years and the trend continues. If one valued the estimated company Operating Income of $63M for 2010 at a lofty 6 times (which is high for a small market player), it results in a valuation in the mid-$50 million range or almost half of the current value and that is BEFORE the attendance debacle of the current quarter.

The theatre industry is probably a good industry in the long run at some price. But the long term outlook is not much growth and with the highly leveraged exhibitors running the business for cash flow, the declining asset base may be the achilles heel in the long run. Be balanced in your analysis and point out both sides of the debate.

valuegeek March 7, 2011 at 7:00 am

Hi Jim,

Thank you for taking the time to comment. I especially appreciate comments which are based on numbers, which I feel is the best basis for a difference in opinion. I will address your points below.

I have dismissed the commonly cited threats to cinema owners in a single sentence for the sake of brevity and because they are widely cited and known. For a long discussion on the shrinking release-to-DVD window, please read my article CKEC : The Hollywood Threat dated Mar 4.

On the issue of capex, my argument is that cinemas do not really require expensive maintenance, and therefore GAAP depreciation is too steep and actual cash flow is higher than GAAP earnings. The major capex items are the construction of the 3D screens, which Carmike has largely already completed. Maintenance is mainly about cleanliness, and maybe a fresh coat of paint a year, both labor intensive tasks which are especially cheap in small cities and towns. About 65% of Carmike’s staff is on minimum wage. The impression I get from my research is that Carmike theaters are reasonably maintained.

You cite a 12% decrease in attendance per screen over the past 4 years. From the 2009 10K, I calculate the following attendance per screen: 2009-23.14k, 2008-21.60k, 2007-22.94k, 2006-24.29k, 2005-24.28k. My guess is the 12% decrease you’re referring to is 2005 through 2008, which is around a 12% drop. Attendance per screen is indeed a key industry metric, but is noisy and highly dependent on the popularity of movies in a given year. 2009, for example, is probably boosted by the popularity of “Avatar” and “The Blind Side”. Still, I would attribute the dip in attendance in 2007-2008 to belt-tightening during the recession. In the end, I feel that people have a need for communal experiences. Of the communal experiences commonly available, including movies, live concerts/shows, and sports events, I think that movies are the cheapest and most popular, and attendance is unlikely to drop to nil, if indeed they are dropping at all.

As for the $63M in 2010 operating income, I am having difficulty locating this number. The 2010 full year results have not been released (conference call is tomorrow), and extrapolating from 9 month results may be iffy, since the quarterly results are somewhat volatile. Also, I am confused about how 6x63M = 50M, plus where you source the 6x multiple from. It would be helpful to me if you clarified your calculations with more specific sources for the numbers.

Finally, you mention that the “declining asset base may be the achilles heel in the long run”. Actually, a declining asset base merely means that the company is depreciating too aggressively, and a value opportunity may be present. See my previous ASCMA investment on how assets were carried at a large discount to eventual sale price on the balance sheet. However, I think that you misspoke and what you meant was that Carmike’s cinemas are getting shoddier and run-down as a result of management skimping on maintenance expenses to maximize cash flow to service enormous debt, and as a result customers are fleeing in droves. I don’t think this is happening at all. I think that Carmike’s management has already made the most important investments, namely 3D screens and digital distribution, and attendance is steady as the company is dropping underperforming cinemas and increasing ticket prices, a sign of its substantial market power.

http://criminaliteitswijzer.nl/wiki/index.php?title=Expertise_On_Going_Ecologically_Friendly_With_The_F_Cigarette April 9, 2013 at 8:57 pm

Great article, just what I was looking for.

my marriage July 26, 2013 at 10:36 am

Don’t forget there is far more than the simple sexual aspect.

Mana View July 26, 2013 at 10:05 pm

Rudraprayag is 1 of the Panch Prayags or five confluences of Alaknanda River.
It is an ancient temple of beheaded Ganesha.

Magnetic Messaging Examples August 5, 2013 at 9:54 am

Managing the program’s sources is 1 of its responsibilities.

หมอนรองกระดูกทับเส้นประสาท August 31, 2014 at 1:45 am

Without scientific analysis of the devices’ workings, it is impossible
to determine whether the claims about zero point energy wands are true.
Crunches and leg lifts are great exercises to strengthen those
core muscles. This does not happen over night but takes a long time to affect us.

Visit the next web site September 23, 2014 at 6:21 am

CKEC : A Conviction Buy How Much Is The Cheapest Hermes Bag

Sal October 12, 2014 at 12:44 pm

It’s in fact very complex in this busy life to listen news on TV, so I just use the web for
that reason, and obtain tthe hottest information.

Leave a Comment

{ 2 trackbacks }

Previous post:

Next post: